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I.

STATEMENT OF JURISDICTION
Pursuant to U.C.A. § 78-2-2(3)0), and the Utah Constitution, Art. VIII, § 3, this

Court has jurisdiction over the present appeal.
II. STATEMENT OF THE ISSUES
A.

Questions Presented
1. Did the court below err when it held that negligent misrepresentation requires

contractual privity between the developer and the home-buyer? This issue was preserved
below. (R at 705-682.)1
2. Did the district court err in ruling that Appellants' fraudulent concealment
cause of action requires contractual privity between the developer and the home-buyer?
This issue was preserved below. (R at 705-682.)
3. Did the district court err in ruling that developers do not owe home-buyers a
duty of care vis-a-vis a claim for negligence? This issue was preserved below. (R at 705682.)
B.

Standard of Review
Because summary judgment is granted as a matter of law, a trial court's legal

conclusions are given no deference and its decision is reviewed for correctness - i.e. de

1

Appellants cite their opposition brief to Appellee's summary judgment memorandum
which is numbered backwards (pages 705 - 682) in the record.
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novo review. Walker Drug Co.. Inc. v La Sal Oil Co.. 902 P.2d 1229, 1231 (Utah 1995).
III. STATEMENT OF THE CASE
A.

Nature of the Case
Appellee is an experienced, licensed land developer. Appellants are first-time

home-buyers who purchased a house built by GT Investments on Lot 223 of the
Summercrest Subdivision in Lehi, Utah. GT Investments had purchased Lot 223 from
Appellee and his partner, Patterson Construction, Inc.
A few years after Appellants purchased the house, the house began settling,
causing severe damage. Subsequently, Appellants discovered the foundation of their
house was built on a former ravine which had been filled in by the developers which, in
turn, caused the house to settle.
B.

Proceedings Below
Appellants instituted a residential construction defect lawsuit against Appellee and

Patterson Construction - who co-developed the Summercrest Subdivision - and the home
builders (GT Investments and Joseph Sharp). Subsequently, all of the Defendants below
filed for summary judgment, but only Appellee proved successful.2 Appellants appeal his

2

In awarding Appellee summary judgment, the court below provided no memorandum
decision. Rather, the court below simply signed a summary judgment order. (See, Exhibit A).
Thus, this appeal brief is based largely on the summary judgment arguments Appellee raised
below in his briefing.
-2-

summary judgment award.
C.

Material Facts
Pre-Development Facts
The Summercrest subdivision was developed by Appellee and Patterson

Construction. (R at 704, f 1). When Appellee began grading and developing the
Summercrest subdivision, he was grading into virgin country; no one had developed there
before. Around this time, Appellee hired Cole Engineering to survey and plat the land. (R
at 704, % 3.) (See, Subdivision Map attached hereto as Exhibit F) Cole Engineering
conducted its survey just before the lots were platted and developed, in approximately
1992 or 1993.3 (R at 704, ^ 4.)
At the time Appellee developed the Summercrest Subdivision, one of the
Subdivision's neighbors was Micah Merrill who lived most of his life just to the South of
and just below the property which later became Lot 223 of the Summercrest Subdivision.
(R at 703, TI 5.) Mr. Merrill could see from where he lived the lots around Lot 223 and
the road that runs in front of Lot 223 - "Summercrest Drive." (R at 703, ^f 6.) In
approximately the Spring or Summer of 1993, Mr. Merrill saw much construction activity
going on in the area above his house and in the area of Lot 223. The entire face of the

3

This survey is the source of Cole's pre-development contour/elevation map, which is
attached hereto as Exhibit B, and which shows what the land looked like before Appellee began
development.
-3-

land was changed dramatically with much heavy machinery. Mr. Merrill also saw
Summercrest Drive put in. (R at 703, ^7.)
Also, Mr. Merrill recalls a ravine which existed before the construction work and
which ran right through Lot 223. (R at 703, ^8.) He used to ride through this ravine
when he was a kid. (R at 703, f 9.) However, the ravine was filled in during the
development work described above and became Lot 223. Id Consistent with filling in
the ravine, James Patterson (principal of Appellee's partner, Patterson Construction)
testified that lots in the Summercrest Subdivision sometimes contained fill from a
"pushover." (Rat 703,110.)
Chain of Title Facts
Prior to all this development, Appellee and Patterson Construction obtained the
land in question as "joint tenants with full rights of survivorship" via a quit claim deed on
April 27, 1993. (R at 702,113.) The land in question remained in the joint names of
Appellee and Patterson Construction throughout the development of the Summercrest
Subdivision. (R at 702,114.) After the land in question was platted, Appellee and
Patterson Construction both conveyed their joint interests in Lot 223 to GT. Investments
on October 10, 1995. (R at 702, f 15.) Appellee first conveyed his interest to Patterson
Construction (recorded on October 11, 1995 at 4:23pm), and then Patterson conveyed its
interest to GT Investments (recorded one minute later) on October 11, 1995 at 4:24pm.

•-4-

(R at 702, If 18.) Before or after title was conveyed to GT Investments, neither Patterson
Construction nor Appellee ever disclosed to GT Investments that Lot 223 was covered
with uncompacted fill, or that the lot had formerly been a ravine that was filled in during
development. (R at 701,119.) Finally, GT Investments conveyed Lot 223 to Appellants
on August 26, 1996 - ten months after it had purchased Lot 223 from Appellee and
Patterson Construction. (R at 701, ^ 21.)
Facts regarding Recent Status of House
After experiencing massive cracking and other settlement-related damage to the
foundation of their house, Appellants hired Earthtec to conduct an investigation. As part
of this investigation, Earthtec's lead engineer, Rick Chesnut, compared the preSummercrest Subdivision elevations provided by Cole Engineering with elevations from
a current survey done by Earthtec. (R at 701, ^ 22-23.) This elevation comparison,
attached hereto as Exhibit C, shows that Appellants' house rests partially on deep fill soils
- as much as 14 feet deep - which are inadequate to support the house. (R at 701, % 24.)
Summercrest Drive was cut into the original hill side and fill from the road was placed or
moved onto Lot 223. (R at 700, ^ 26.) Mr. Chesnut concluded, based on geotechnical
testing (which he supervised), survey information, photographs and reports of other
experts, that the uncompacted fill on Lot 223 was placed or moved thereto during the
development of the Summercrest Subdivision. (R at 700, ^ 27.) According to Mr.

-5-

Chesnut, the uncompacted fill is a primary cause of the settling experienced by
Appellants' house. (R at 700,128.)
Appellants hired another professional engineer, Robb Edgar, to conduct a
geotechnical consultation of their house in February of 2000 because of significant signs
of settlement. (R at 700,fflf29-30.) According to on-site inspections, U.S.G.S. maps,4
and U.S. Agricultural Department aerial photographs taken of the property in 1959, 1965,
1980, and 1993 (see. Exhibits D and E for the latter two photographs),5 Mr. Edgar
concluded (similar to Mr. Chesnut) that the footing subgrade material under portions of
Appellants' house consists of improperly compacted fill. (R at 700, Tf 31.) He based this
conclusion on the pre-development aerial photographs, the 1993 aerial photograph, and
the Earthtec drawings/comparison which show the cut and fill that resulted in
uncompacted soil being placed on Lot 223. (R at 700, ^f 35.) Finally, according to
Messrs. Edgar and Chesnut, the fill soil on Lot 223 was moved onto that lot at the time
the road was constructed in 1993, as shown in the 1993 photograph. (R at 699, f 36.)

4

Based on the Lehi Quadrangle 7.5 minute map of the area prior to development and the
1980 and 1993 aerial photographs (attached as Exhibits D and E, respectively), the south corner
of Appellants' house is located on the downhill side of the original slope. (R at 700, f 32.)
5

The 1993 U.S. Agriculture Department aerial photograph depicts much disturbed soil on
Lot 223 as the road in question is being constructed in the Summercrest subdivision. (R at 699,
f 33.) It also shows that the slope that existed below the Lot 223 area (as depicted in the predevelopment photographs) has been filled in.
-6-

Appellants' house rests upon this uncompacted soil, which Messrs. Edgar and Chesnut
conclude is, in large part, the source of the settling experienced by Appellants. (R at 699,
137.)
IV. SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT
The trial court erred in awarding Appellee summary judgment against Appellants'
causes of action for negligent misrepresentation, fraudulent concealment and negligence
because (1) according to Utah caselaw negligent misrepresentation does not require
contractual privity between the developer and the home-buyer; (2) fraudulent
concealment, just like negligent misrepresentation, also does not require contractual
privity between the developer and the home-buyer, but rather requires a duty to disclose
material facts to those who trust them, have less knowledge than them, or to those who
rely on them. Also, Utah public policy militates in favor on imposing a duty to disclose
between developers and third-party home-buyers. Finally, the trial court erred because
(3) developers owe third-party home-buyers a duty of care based on caselaw from Utah
and other jurisdictions.

-7-

V. ARGUMENT
A.

THE COURT BELOW ERRED WHEN IT HELD THAT NEGLIGENT
MISREPRESENTATION REQUIRES CONTRACTUAL PRIVITY
BETWEEN THE DEVELOPER AND THE HOME-BUYER
Appellee's first summary judgment argument was that Appellants' negligent

misrepresentation cause of action fails because Appellants, as third parties, were not privy
to any contract with Appellee. This Court, however, has repeatedly held otherwise.
In Price-Orem Inv. Co. v. Rollins, Brown and GunnelL Inc.. 713 P.2d 55, 59 (Utah
1986), a negligent surveyor argued that its obligations ran only to the general contractor the party with whom it had contracted to survey a shopping center site.6 Id. at 59. Just
like Appellee, the Price-Orem surveyor asserted that because the owner of the site was not
in privity of contract with the surveyor, it had no standing to sue the surveyor for
negligent misrepresentation. Id. In holding that privity was irrelevant for a negligent
misrepresentation claim, the Price-Orem court explained:
Rollins, Brown fundamentally misconceives the nature of this case. Price-Orem's
action alleges the tort of negligent misrepresentation and is neither derived
from nor dependent upon its having rights under the contract between JPA
and Rollins, Brown."
Id, (Emphasis added); see also, Klinger v. Kightly. 889 P.2d 1372, 1378 (Utah App.
1995). The Price-Orem court later concluded in regard to the plaintiffs negligent

6

In Price-Orem, the surveyor (RBG) contracted with contractor (JPA) who built a
shopping center for the third-party owner (Price-Orem).
-8-

misrepresentation clain

at, "Privity of contract is not a necessary prerequisite to

liability." Id at 59 (citing Christenson v. Commonwealth Land Title Insurance Co., 666
P.2d 302, 307 (Utah 1983)). The Christenson court continues the same refrain:
Even without privity, however, one negligently making a false statement may
be held liable. A recent case in point is Dugan v. Jones, Utah, 615 P.2d 1239
(1980). There the third-party plaintiffs were real estate purchasers who had been
told by the third-party defendant, a real estate agent, that the property they were
purchasing comprised 22 3/4 acres, when in fact it comprised only 6.9. We held
that a claim for relief for negligent misrepresentation lies in tort against third
parties to a real estate transaction.
Id. at 305. (Emphasis added). Thus, according to Price-Orem, Klinger, and Christenson,
privity of contract is irrelevant to a claim for negligent misrepresentation.
Appellee claims in regard to Appellants' negligent misrepresentation cause of
action that he "was not in a superior position to know any facts regarding the construction
of the house." (R at 695.) Of course Appellee was not in a position to know the facts
regarding the house construction. That's not why Appellants have sued Appellee.
Appellee was sued because he owned the property in question while the grading and
improvements occurred,7 no construction or improvements had taken place on the
property in question prior to Appellee's improvements,8 Appellee did all the road grading

7

In his deposition, Appellee acknowledged buying the land from Peck with Patterson.
(R at 695, n 7.)
8

Dan Frandsen testified that when they began grading, they were grading into virgin
country - i.e. no one had developed there before. (R at 695, n 8.)
-9-

and utility improvements on Summercrest Drive, Appellee had years of experience in
developing property and is a licensed contractor and developer. (R at 695.) Finally,
circumstantial evidence imputes knowledge to Appellee from his grading the road in
question and filling in the nearby ravine with excess grading fill which later became
Appellants' lot.9
Consequently, Appellee was certainly in a superior position to know the material
facts underlying the property.10 Such was the conclusion of the Klinger court: "we
conclude Calder ; was in a superior position to know the material facts,' id. A licensed
professional surveyor, Calder—unlike the laymen third-party plaintiffs—had the
training and experience to verify the survey results." Klinger, 889 P.2d at 1379
(emphasis added).

9

Besides Messrs. Chestnut and Edgar's expert testimony (as professional engineers)
clearly implicating Appellee (see, Material Facts above), Mr. Merrill, who grew up in the area to
the South of and below the Summer Crest Development, testified that the ravine in question
existed up until Appellee's construction grading, and said the ravine was filled in during the
construction. (See, Material Facts above).
Additionally, Appellee's partner, Mr. Patterson, explained that no one else could have
accounted for any of the disturbed-looking soil around Lot 223. (R at 695, n 9.)
10

Appellee, Dan Frandsen, and even James Patterson go to such great lengths to distance
themselves from the facts underlying the uncompacted fill that they completely contradict their
own stories, which in and of itself, should create an issue of a material fact: Dan Frandsen
testified that because of the deep cuts they made, he had a lot of excess dirt which he had hauled
off in dump trucks. (R at 694, n 10.). Appellee testified to the exact opposite. He stated that the
cut was not deep and that he didn't recall having excess dirt from the cut. Id. James Patterson
even acknowledged sometimes having fill on the lots. Id.
-10-

B.

THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN DISMISSING APPELLANTS'
FRAUDULENT CONCEALMENT CLAIM BECAUSE FRAUDULENT
CONCEALMENT, JUST LIKE NEGLIGENT MISREPRESENTATION,
DOES NOT REQUIRE CONTRACTUAL PRIVITY BETWEEN THE
DEVELOPER AND THE HOME-BUYER
Appellee, leaning against the same straw house he built with contractual privity

against Appellants' negligent misrepresentation cause of action, again claims that
contractual privity is required for Appellants to maintain their cause of action for
fraudulent concealment. And again, just as with negligent misrepresentation, this Court
has held otherwise.
1.

Utah Caselaw Imputes to Developers a Duty to Disclose Material Facts
to Those Who Trust Them, Have Less Knowledge Than Them, or to
Those Who Rely on Them

In Utah, the fraudulent concealment cause of action requires:
one with a legal duty or obligation to communicate certain facts remain silent
or otherwise act to conceal material facts known to him. Such a duty or
obligation may arise from a relationship of trust between the parties, an
inequality of knowledge or power between the parties, or other attendant
circumstances indicating reliance.... Such '[c]oncealment or nondisclosure
becomes fraudulent only when there is an existing fact or condition ... which the
party charged is under a duty to disclose.'
McDougal v. Weed. 945 P.2d 175, 179 (Utah App. 1997) (citation omitted) (emphasis
added). Nowhere does the McDougal court require contractual privity between the
parties. Instead, the McDougal court looks at a duty to disclose that arises from a
relationship of trust or inequality of knowledge between the parties to establish this cause

-11-

of action.11
This Court in Loveland v. Orem City Corp.. 746 P.2d 763 (Utah 1987) elaborated
on a developer's duty to disclose. The Loveland court held that a land developer owes a
duty to the purchaser to disclose deficiencies that are not easily discernible during
ordinary and reasonable investigation and to disclose conditions which the developer
knows or should know and which makes subdivided lots unsuitable for residential
building. Id. at 769-70. Clearly, Appellants had no way to know how uncompacted the
soil was beneath their house - soil which, according to two licensed professional
engineers, a neighborhood observer, photographs and maps, could have only been placed
there by Appellee. (R at 692.)
By contrast, the court in DeBrv v. Valley Mortgage, 835 P.2d 1000 (Utah App.
1992) explained that a duty to speak will not be found '"where the parties deal at arm's
length, and where the underlying facts are reasonably within the knowledge of both
parties.'"12 Id. at 1007 (citations omitted). Again, the underlying facts regarding the

11

For a comparison of the disparate knowledge between the parties, see page 13-14

below.
12

The DeBrv court held there was not a duty to speak under afraudtheory because there
were no special circumstances alleged which created such a theory:
The DeBrys do not claim Valley Mortgage made false representations, only that it failed
to disclose information to them about the building which it knew or should have known.
There is nothing in the pleadings to indicate Valley Mortgage was in a better position
than were the DeBrys, to have access to the relevant information, or that precluded the
-12-

condition of the soil underneath Appellants' house were clearly not within the knowledge
of Appellants when they purchased the property.13
In support of his claim that Appellants' fraudulent concealment cause of action
fails due to a lack of contractual privity, Appellee claims that all material information
related to the lot "was disclosed by [Appellee] to Patterson Construction. Additionally,
the backfill compaction complained of by [Appellants] is not a material fact which was
known by [Appellee]." (R at 691.) Contrary to this factually unsupported claim,
Appellee:
downed the land that became Lot 22314
^graded Summercrest Drive,1:)
>^hired engineers to survey and stake the land,16

DeBrys from seeking the information.
DeBrv, supra, 835 at 1007. Contrast the facts behind the DeBrv court's holding with the nearly
opposite facts underlying Appellants' fraudulent concealment claim.
13

Indeed, GT Investments, which bought Lot 223 from Appellee and his partner inspected
the lot as Appellants' house was being constructed and was unable to determine that the lot
contained uncompacted fill. (R at 901, n 15.)
l4

(Rat704,1|l; 702413.)

15

(Rat70346.)

16

(Rat691,nl7.)
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>^put in the road improvements, and
>^sold the lot to GT. Investments.18
Furthermore, Mr. Merrill testified that at this time Appellee filled in the ravine,19 and Mr.
Patterson testified that Appellee had in the past left fill on some lots.20 Thus, according to
Messrs. Merrill, Patterson and the expert engineers,21 Appellee must have known or
should have known the material fact that the lot sold to GT. Investments/Appellants was
full of uncompacted soils.
Thus, nowhere in Utah caselaw is a contractual nexus required for the fraudulent
concealment cause of action. Instead, a duty to disclose based on a relationship of trust or
inequality of knowledge between the parties is required (and which exists) in the present
case.

l7

(Rat69l,1fl8.)

18

(Rat695,n7.)

19

(Rat691,nl9.)

20

Mr. Patterson acknowledged sometimes having fill on the lots: "Q: Did you ever run
into any fill on any of the other lots? A: Yeah. Yeah, there's some that we have fill, you know,
from a pushover." (R at 690, n 20.)
21

Mr. Chesnut, Appellants' geotechnical engineer, concluded that, based on geotechnical
testing (which he supervised), survey information, photographs and reports of other experts, the
fill soils on Lot 223 where placed or moved thereto during the development of the Summercrest
Subdivision. (R at 700, f 27.) According to geotechnical engineers Edgar and Chesnut, the
uncompacted soil on Lot 223 was moved there at the time the road (that runs in front of Lot 223)
was constructed in 1993, as shown in the 1993 photograph. (R at 699, <| 36.)
-14-

2.

Other Jurisdictions Also Hold a Developer Liable for Defective
Conditions

Caselaw from other jurisdictions and secondary authorities encountering similar
situations to the one at bar have imposed a duty on a vendor/developer to a third party
based on the vendor/developer's fraudulent concealment of a dangerous condition.
The general rule in the context of personal injury, of course, is that a vendor of real
estate is not liable for injuries caused to "a purchaser or third person caused by a
defective condition of the premises existing at the time the purchaser takes possession."
Emile F. Short, Annotation, Liability of Vendor or Grantor of Real Estate for Personal
Injury to Purchaser or Third Person Due to Defective Condition of Premises, 58 A.L.R.3d
1027, § 3 (2002) (emphasis added) (citations omitted). Exceptions, however, exist.
The first exception to the general nonliability rule is when a dangerous condition
existed at the time the vendee took possession which the vendor concealed or failed to
disclose to the vendee. Id. at § 4a; see also, Restatement (Second) of Torts § 353. Such
liability extends not only to the vendee, but to third parties who might have also been
injured by the condition concealed by the vendor. Id.
Another exception to the general nonliability rule is when the dangerous condition
was created by the vendor. Id. at § 4b. Again, such liability extends not only to the
vendee, but also to third parties. Id.
Although the context of the above rule and its two notable exceptions is in regard
-15-

to personal injury rather than injury to property, the principle that a vendor should be held
accountable for his intentional and fraudulent conduct vis-vis a third-party applies
regardless of whether the injury be to person or property. In other words, just as the cases
in the above ALR impute liability to the vendor for personal injury caused to a third party
by the vendor's intentional deception, the same rationale supports a vendor's liability for
fraudulently concealing a condition that injures a third-party's property.
One case that indeed holds a vendor (developer) liable for fraudulently concealing
a condition that injured the property of a third-party is Lawson v. Citizens and Southern
National Bank of South Carolina, 180 S.E. 2d 206 (S.C. 1971), where a man purchased a
residential lot from the defendant-developer and built a house thereon and later conveyed
the house to his ex-wife as part of a divorce settlement. Subsequently, she (the thirdparty) discovered that the house "had been build over a ravine, which had been filled with
unsuitable material by the defendant..." Id. at 208. She and her former-husband filed a
complaint against the developer. The complaint charged that:
the defendant in developing and subdividing its land into lots to be sold for
residential use only, filled an enormous gulley [sic] with stumps and other rubble
to a depth of twenty to twenty-five feet and concealed this fill by covering it with
soil.
Id. The Lawson defendant demurred to the complaint which was sustained by the circuit
court. Id. However, on appeal, the South Carolina Supreme Court reversed the demurrer,
holding:
-16-

We have no precedent in our decisions involving nondisclosure of an artificially
created, and concealed, unstable condition of land sold. However, courts
elsewhere, applying settled principles, have consistently found a duty to disclose in
landfill cases on analogous facts. [Citations omitted].
We are satisfied that the facts alleged in this complaint are sufficient to support an
inference of fraudulent concealment;
Id. at 208-09. In regard to Mrs. Lawson's third-party status, the Lawson court held that,
"The cause of action for general and special damages ripened in Mr. Lawson upon
completion of the dwelling, and defendant's liability was unaffected by his subsequent
conveyance of the premises [to Mrs. Lawson]." Id. at 209; see also, Tillis v. Smith Sons
Lumber Co., 188 Ala. 122, 130-31 (1914) (holding that the fact that the defendant in an
action for deceit was not a party to the contract which he induced by his fraudulent
representations did not affect his liability in damages for the difference between the actual
and the represented value of the property received by the plaintiff in the transaction).
Thus, caselaw in other jurisdictions, along with secondary authority, illustrate the
liability courts have imputed to a vendor/developer for his fraudulent concealment of a
dangerous condition that injures a third-party or the property of the third-party.
3.

Utah Public Policy Also Militates in Favor on Imposing a Duty to
Disclose Between Developers and Third-Party Home-Buyers

Utah land developers should owe future home-buyers a duty to disclose pursuant to
McDougal and Loveland. Utah is undergoing an unprecedented amount of construction
and growth due to the influx of families and workers into the state. Accordingly, the
-17-

situation encountered by Appellants will undoubtedly be experienced by an increasing
number of home-buyers who often put substantial amounts of money into purchasing a
new house - even their entire savings. Meanwhile, there is nothing stopping unsavory
developers from developing parcels of land with uncompacted fill (and thus cannot
support a house) because home-buyers do not ordinarily contract with the developers.
Home-buyers thus have little recourse against the developer who is often the party
with the greatest amount of knowledge regarding the condition of a parcel he has
developed. Home-buyers thus indirectly rely on the developers to provide lots suitable
for the very purpose for which they are developed - to support a house. Thus, according
to the superior knowledge enjoyed by developers regarding the conditions of a lot and the
trust indirectly placed on them by future home-buyers, developers should owe homebuyers a duty to disclose all conditions material to the parcel of land at issue.
According to Appellee and the trial court, even if a developer is caught filling in a
ravine red-handed, the developer cannot be held liable to the future home-buyer. Does
the Court want to set this kind of precedent in construction defect cases?
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C.

THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN DISMISSING APPELLANTS5
NEGLIGENCE CAUSE OF ACTION BECAUSE DEVELOPERS OWE
THIRD-PARTY HOME-BUYERS A DUTY OF CARE ACCORDING TO
CASELAW FROM UTAH AND OTHER JURISDICTIONS
Finally, Appellee argued below that / -pellants' negligence cause of action fails

because "[Appellee] did not owe [Appellants] a duty of care." (R at 690.) The following
caselaw, however, refute this claim.
This Court in Loveland, supra, addressed this issue - to wit, whether developers
(like Appellee) owe a duty of care to third-party home-buyers (like Appellants) who were
not privy to the developer/builder agreement. In its analysis, the Loveland court looked to
Anderson v. Bauer, 681 P.2d 1316 (Wyo. 1984) where "a defendant developer purchased
raw acreage and subdivided the same into residential building lots. These lots were in
turn sold to defendant builders who constructed houses thereon that were later purchased
by eight plaintiff owners." Loveland, 746 P.2d at 769. The Anderson court held:
The developer ought to also have responsibility for his activities. . .. Thus, it is
reasonable that, where land is subdivided and sold for the purpose of constructing
residential dwelling houses, the developer has a duty to exercises reasonable
care to insure that the subdivided lots are suitable for construction of some type of
ordinary, average dwelling house and he must disclose to his purchaser any
condition which he knows or reasonably ought to know makes the subdivided
lots unsuitable for such residential building.
Anderson, 681 P.2d at 1323 (quoted in Loveland, 746 p.2d at 769) (emphasis added).
The Loveland court approvingly noted that, "The duty defined by the Wyoming court [in
Anderson! and our interpretation thereof is consistent with existing Utah law."
-19-

Loveland, 746 P.2d at 769 (emphasis added). The Loveland court also mentioned U.C.A.
§ 57-11-17(1), whose provisions "persuasively" fashion the duty of a developer to his
vendees:
(1) Any person who:
* * *

(c) in disposing of subdivided lands, omits a material fact required to be stated in a
registration statement, public offering statement, statement of record or public
report, necessary to make the statements made not misleading;
is liable as provided in this section to the purchaser unless, in the case of an
untruth or omission, it is proved that the purchaser knew of the untruth or omission
or that the person offering or disposing of subdivided lands did not know and in
the exercise of reasonable care could not have known of the untruth or omission.
Thus, Loveland, Anderson, Stepanov v. Gavrilovich,22 and UCA § 57-11-17(1) all
support the idea that a developer indeed owes a third-party home-buyer a duty of care
regarding dangerous conditions (which he knows of or should know of) on the property
he develops.
Appellee nevertheless argues that "Plaintiff cannot show that the road, utilities,
curb, gutter, sidewalks caused a crack in the foundation of the Property." (R at 688.)
Appellee simply attempts to obfuscate the critical point: fill generated from his grading of
the road in question was pushed over into a nearby rayine according to two engineering

22

594 P.2d 30 (Alaska 1979) (relied upon by the Anderson court and cited approvingly in
Loveland at 770).
-20-

experts, photographs, maps, and a lay bystander. Upon this filled-in ravine was built
Appellants' house.
VI. CONCLUSION
Based on the foregoing, the trial court's award of summary judgment was
improper and should be reversed. The Court should accordingly remand Appellants'
claims for fraudulent concealment, negligent misrepresentation and negligence back to
the trial court for further disposition.

RESPECTFULLY SUBMITTED this

» ( day of July, 2002.

HILL, JOHNSON & SCHMUTZ, L.C.

STEPHEN QUESENBERRY
Attorneys for Appellants
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EXHIBIT "A"

Michael W. Homer (#1535)
Jesse C. Trentadue (#4961)
Thomas B. Price (#8254)
SUITTER AXLAND
175 South West Temple, Suite 700
Salt Lake City, UT 84101-1480
Telephone: (801) 532-7300
Attorneys for Defendants Mel Frandsen
dba Mary Mel Construction Co.

IN THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT OF UTAH COUNTY
STATE OF UTAH

STEVE and CATHERINE SMITH,
individuals,
Plaintiffs,

ORDER GRANTING SUMMARY
JUDGMENT WITH RESPECT TO
DEFENDANT MEL FRANDSEN dba
MARY MEL CONSTRUCTION CO.

vs.

PATTERSON CONSTRUCTION, INC., a
Utah corporation; JOSEPH SHARP, an
individual; GT INVESTMENTS, MEL
FRANDSEN dba MARY MEL
CONSTRUCTION CO.,

Case No. 000402150
Judge Fred D. Howard

Defendants.

On October 31,2001, Defendant Mel Frandsen d/b/a Mary Mel Construction Co.'s Motion
for Summary Judgment came on for a regularly scheduling hearing before the honorable Fred D.
Howard. Plaintiffs Steve and Catherine Smith were represented at that hearing by Stephen
Quesenberry of Hill, Johnson & Schmutz L.C. and Defendant Mel Frandsen d/b/a Mary Mel

Construction Co. was represented by Jesse C. Trentadue of Suitter Axland. The Courting having
fully considered the arguments of counsel, the submissions of the parties, the applicable legal
authority and good cause appearing therefor:
1.

IT IS HEREBY ORDERED ADJUDGED AND DECREED THAT Defendant

Mel Frandsen's d/b/a Mary Mel Construction Co.'s Motion for Summary; Judgment is granted;
2.

IT IS FURTHER ORDERED ADJUDGED AND DECREED THAT with respect

to the claims asserted against Mel Frandsen d/b/a Mary Mel Construction Co. Plaintiffs, Second
Amended Complaint is dismissed with prejudice; and
3.

IT IS FINALLY ORDERED ADJUDGED AND DECREED THAT the parties

shall bear their respective costs and attorney's fees.
DATED this

day of November, 2001.

Honorable Fred D. Howard
District Court Judge
Approved as y/foptfx: '

j

Sjm^^uepnberFy, Esq.
HlIX^J^
L.C.
Attorney for Plaintiff Steve & Catherine Smith

Jesse C. Trentadue
Suitter Axland
Counsel for Defendant Mel Frandsen
d/b/a Mary Mel Construction Co.

CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
I hereby certify that on the 6th day of November, 2001, a true and correct copy of the
foregoing ORDER GRANTING SUMMAR Y JUDGMENT WITH RESPECT TO DEFENDANT
MEL FRANDSEN dba MARY MEL CONSTRUCTION CO. was served byfirst-classUnited
States -mail, postage pre-paid, to:
Stephen Quesenberry, Esq.
HILL, JOHNSON & SCHMUTZ L.C.

Jamestown Square
3319 North University Avenue, Suite 200
Provo.UT 84604
Attorneys for Plaintiff
William J. Hansen, Esq.
CHRISTENSEN & JENSEN, P.C.

50 South Main Street, Suite 1500
Salt Lake City, UT 84144
Attorneys for Patterson Construction, Inc.
Barbara K. Berrett, Esq..
WEISS BERRETT PETTY, L.C.

50 South Main Street, Suite 530
Salt Lake City, UT 84144
Attorneys for Joseph Sharp and GT Enterprises
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